A breakthrough year in relations between Turkey and the European Union – an attempt to take stock. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 224 | 18.10.2016 by Chudziak, Mateusz & Strachota, Krzysztof
1OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 224
www.osw.waw.plCentre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 224 | 18.10.2016
Mateusz Chudziak, Krzysztof Strachota
September 2016 marks the passing of one year has passed since the outbreak of the EU mi-
gration crisis which became the basis of unprecedented co-operation between Turkey and the 
EU. Paradoxically, although this co-operation in containing the crisis has proven surprising-
ly effective, the climate of Turkish-EU relations has significantly deteriorated. This situation 
comes in part as a result of internal tensions in Turkey (and within the EU). However, genuine 
changes in the power relations between Turkey and the EU have occurred and Turkey feels 
that issues it attaches importance to are not being appropriately addressed by the EU – the 
frustration this causes has been even more instrumental in the deterioration of relations. This 
shift in relations between Turkey and the EU also stems from Turkey’s aspirations to eman-
cipate itself in its relations with the West; there has been an upward trend in this regard for 
years. The instruments the EU has so far been employing in order to put Turkey under pressure 
(above all the EU integration process) are losing their effectiveness, which is in stark contrast 
with Turkey’s emancipation and assertiveness. However, irrespective of the present and future 
inevitable tensions in Turkish-EU relations, Turkey’s aim is not to break off with the EU but 
to develop a new model of strategic relations which better serves its own interests. Despite 
the recent rapprochement with Russia, Ankara seems to be aware of a lack of alternatives to 
strategic co-operation with the EU and, more broadly, with the West. 
The paradoxes of the breakthrough year 
The EU migration crisis, which began between 
August and September 2015, has brought about 
a breakthrough in Turkish-EU relations. At the 
initiative of the European Commission and Ger-
many – a plan to engage Ankara in containing 
and consequently in resolving the most serious 
crisis in the EU in years has been developed1. 
This took the form of a series of visits that poli-
ticians paid to Turkey last year2. Fundamentally, 
1 A draft agreement was adopted at the Turkey-EU sum-
mit on 29th November 2015. Upon completion, it was 
approved at another summit on 20th March 2016. 
2 Including visits of the president and the vice-president 
of the EU, two EU commissioners and Chancellor Angela 
Merkel. 
the plan committed Turkey to tightening con-
trols on the Turkish-Greek border (the main mi-
gration route to the EU at that time), to taking 
measures to improve the situation of refugees 
residing in Turkish territory, and to implement-
ing the programme of deportations and reloca-
tions of migrants between Turkey and the EU. 
In exchange Turkey was promised substantial fi-
nancial support (in total €6 bn by 2018), a major 
intensification of political relations (it was guar-
anteed twice yearly Turkey-EU summits) and fi-
nally a resumption of the accession process with 
the EU committing to the swift introduction of 
a visa-free regime with Turkey. 
The plan to co-operate with Turkey to prevent 
the uncontrolled and massive influx of refugees 
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/migrants from the Middle East has turned out 
to be surprisingly effective. Between March 
and June 2016 the number of migrants coming 
from Turkey to Greece fell by 95%3, though it 
slightly increased in mid-July following a failed 
coup d’état in Turkey4. The EU has opened an-
other chapter in the accession negotiations 
with Turkey (announcing the opening of fur-
ther chapters) and has intensified work on 
introducing the visa-free regime with Turkey 
which was initially scheduled for 30th June 
but was later postponed to the end of 2016. 
The period of effective collaboration over the 
huge crisis and the elevation of bilateral rela-
tions to an unheard-of level have simultaneously 
become a time of unprecedented deterioration 
in the atmosphere of relations between Turkey 
and the EU, mainly at the level of the rhetoric. 
This appears to be a paradox. Representatives 
of the Turkish government have traditionally 
accused the EU of anti-Turkish sentiment and 
Islamophobia5, of hypocrisy, a blatant failure to 
follow through on agreements (including the 
lack of promised financial aid and sabotaging 
3 Thus the pressure on the Balkan route has eased – from 
the EU perspective the tightening of controls on that 
route (without taking the role of Turkey into account) is 
seen as having been the decisive factor contributing to 
the containment of the migration crisis. 
4 Before the Turkey-EU agreement on average 1,740 per-
sons were arriving in Greece a day. Since the beginning 
of May this year the number has dropped to below 47. In 
this period of time the EU has taken in 511 Syrians from 
Turkey in exchange for 462 persons who were returned 
to Turkey. Since mid-July 100-200 persons a day start-
ed coming to Greece. See: Implementing the EU-Turkey 
Statement – Questions and Answers, 15.06.2016, http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1664_en.htm
5 This conviction is shared by the secular opposition, 
which further weakens the EU’s reliability in Turkish so-
ciety. See: Selin Girit, Türkiye düşmanlığı kartı, Cumhuri-
yet, 24.05.2016, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/koseya-
zisi/538803/Turkiye_dusmanligi_karti.html
the liberalisation of the visa regime) and of hav-
ing an ambiguous attitude to the anti-govern-
ment forces in Turkey. They have also publicly 
blackmailed the EU, threatening to withdraw 
from the co-operation (both in the area of mi-
gration and strategic areas) or to support illegal 
migrations to the EU.
In the European media and also in certain state-
ments made by politicians, growing criticism of 
the Turkish government due to Turkey’s internal 
politics is present. The area which has come un-
der the heaviest fire is the ruthless fight against 
the opposition, including the independent 
media, the brutal battle against the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) and finally the broad re-
pression of the judicial system, education, the 
media and the police following the failed coup 
d’état of 15th July 2016. The main reason for the 
EU not meeting the deadline for introducing the 
liberalisation of the visa regime has been the 
fact that the Turkish government has resolutely 
refused to change the controversial anti-terror-
ist law (used in combating the opposition)6. In 
the EU there is the dominant conviction of Tur-
key’s ‘otherness’ in terms of civilisation, further 
enhanced by the belief that Turkey’s politics is 
radically anti-European (an authoritarian re-
gime and Islamisation in internal politics, a shift 
towards Russia in Turkey’s foreign policy). 
The end of the present formula  
of Turkish-EU relations 
Both the strategic Turkish-EU co-operation over 
the migration crisis and the intense conflict 
between Ankara and Brussels are signs of fun-
damental changes in relations between Turkey 
and the EU, above all of Turkey’s accelerated 
emancipation from Europe. 
Europe (and, since the Cold War, also the US) 
has been the main reference point for Tur-
6 See: Mateusz Chudziak, Turkey/EU: playing hardball on 
visa liberalisation, OSW Analyses, 11.05.2016, https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-05-11/
turkey/eu-playing-hardball-visa-liberalisation  
Turkish-EU co-operation alongside the 
Turkish-EU conflict are a manifestation of 
fundamental changes in mutual relations.
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key in terms of politics, civilisation (modern-
isation) and economy for two hundred years. 
In modern times this is manifested in Tur-
key’s membership in NATO, its attempts to 
join the EU, and its strong economic7 and so-
cial ties (including approximately 4.7 million 
Turks in the Western European countries8). 
Due to the asymmetry of potential, the huge 
differences in social and political development 
(serious democratic shortcomings) and a feel-
ing of otherness in terms of civilisation, to date 
Turkey has been treated as a supplicant and the 
accession process has been deemed impossible 
to implement in full. In Turkey the awareness 
of Europe’s attitude towards it, together with 
an increase in the country’s self-esteem are the 
main reasons for the resentment9 towards the 
West, coupled with a fascination with it. 
The rise to power of the Justice and Devel-
opment Party (AKP) in 2002 significantly 
strengthened Turkey’s pro-EU orientation. In 
the first years of its rule this orientation played 
a key role in the process of a fundamental 
political and social transformation of Turkish 
7 Trade between Turkey and the EU in 2015 amounted to 
€140.7 bn; approximately 40% of Turkish exports go 
to the EU; see: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/coun-
tries-and-regions/countries/turkey/ 
8 According to data provided by the Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, see: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-expatri-
ate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa
9 This is also manifested by the conviction present in a sec-
tion of conservative public opinion that there is no alter-
native to partnership with Europe, despite the ‘love-hate’ 
relationship with the West. See: Hasan Bülent Kahraman, 
Niye biz Avrupa’yı ‘içermeyelim’?, Sabah, 5.09.2016, http://
www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/kahraman/2016/09/05/ni-
ye-biz-avrupayi-icermeyelim 
society (democratisation, the replacement of 
the elite), an accelerated modernisation and 
dynamic economic development. This result-
ed in the opening of the EU accession process 
in 2005. Turkey’s successes have substantially 
increased the ambition of the elites, but is in 
stark contrast with intensified problems within 
the EU due to the 2008 economic crisis and an 
important fall in support for the idea of EU en-
largement (the EU integration process in fact 
slowed down around 2008). Ankara respond-
ed to it by intensifying its activity in the Mid-
dle East, which was regarded as an area where 
it could develop political and economic influ-
ence as well as a potential alternative source 
of revenue and investments. The apogee of 
Turkey’s reorientation to the Middle East came 
during the Arab Spring (2011) in which Turkey 
become quite strongly involved (mainly in the 
Syrian conflict, more widely in the support 
for moderate Islamist forces), hoping that it 
would enhance its attractiveness in NATO and 
the EU. These hopes were finally scuppered 
in 2013 (the deadlock in Syria, the victory of 
the counter-revolution in Egypt) proved futile 
and Turkey’s Middle Eastern policy directly led 
to various consequences: an escalation of the 
conflict with the PKK, the emergence of Islam-
ic terrorism in Turkey, and a massive influx of 
Syrian refugees (nearly 3 million in 2016)10. 
In parallel, in 2013 the country’s internal sit-
uation deteriorated (which was caused by 
protests over Gezi Park, the conflict with the 
Gulen movement, and the resumption of in-
tense conflict with the PKK). This gave way to 
ever-growing authoritarian tendencies which 
generate tensions in Turkey’s relations with 
the West. 
10 This number has been consistently growing since the be-
ginning of the conflict. According to data from 1st Janu-
ary 2014 – 560,000 registered refugees. According to data 
from 25th August – 2,726,000. These figures do not take 
into account unregistered refugees, persons who have left 
Turkey for the EU during the migration crisis and refugees 
from Iraq and migrants from other countries; see: http://
data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 
In spring 2015 Turkey was faced with seri-
ous internal and external challenges, while 
being convinced of the bankruptcy of its 
Middle Eastern policy and the fact that there 
is no alternative to its co-operation with the 
EU and NATO.
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Just before the migration crisis in the summer 
of 2015, Turkey was confronted with many se-
rious internal and external challenges, with the 
feeling of the bankruptcy of its Middle Eastern 
policy (including the country’s alienation in the 
region) and the conviction that there was no 
alternative to co-operation with the EU and 
NATO, regardless of the fact that these two in-
stitutions were increasingly mistrustful of Tur-
key and frustrated with its politics.  
The migration crisis:  
a crisis in Turkish-EU relations 
The migration crisis in 2015 acted as a catalyst 
for fundamental changes in Turkish-EU rela-
tions. The huge number of migrants who ar-
rived in Europe (mainly via Turkey) in autumn 
2015 and the scale of the constant migration 
pressure on Europe from the Middle East and 
Africa present a large and long-term challenge 
for the EU. For the first time in history, the re-
lations of dependence in Turkish-EU contacts 
have changed—Ankara has at least a short-term 
solution to the EU’s strategic problem. Turkey 
has gained the possibility to strengthen its po-
sition in relations with the EU, to shake up the 
existing and new co-operation mechanisms and 
to use the EU’s dependence on it to realise its 
short-term objectives in internal policy. By mak-
ing active use of the migration crisis, togeth-
er with the huge dynamics of changes within 
Turkey and the EU, Turkey is gradually leading 
to attempts to permanently redefine Turk-
ish-EU relations. This seems to be the decisive 
factor forming the current bilateral tensions. 
At first (at the latest until the resignation of 
Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in May this 
year) Turkey’s politics focused on taking max-
imum advantage of its partner’s weakness in 
order to realise its own interests, while main-
taining the basic tenets of its politics. Inducing 
Chancellor Angela Merkel to visit Turkey at the 
height of the campaign for the early parliamen-
tary election (October 2015) was Turkey’s initial 
success. As was the case with visits of repre-
sentatives of the European Commission, this 
visit was seen as support for the AKP despite 
the fact that the opposition and liberal circles 
raised concerns about the state of Turkey’s de-
mocracy. Turkey’s demands that the accession 
process be unblocked, that Turkey-EU summits 
be held twice a year, that the liberation of the 
visa regime be accelerated and that financial 
aid be provided to help refugees from Syria 
were part of the paradigm that was in effect at 
that time. Meeting these demands or announc-
ing that they would be met was undoubtedly 
an important success for Turkish diplomacy, 
leading Turkey out of its growing isolation. 
Apart from this, Turkey resumed the project 
to establish a security zone in northern Syria 
(mainly in its rhetoric), both as a sanctuary for 
refugees heading to Turkey and then Europe 
but also as a platform for strengthening Tur-
key’s political and military position in Syria. This 
issue became particularly sensitive with the suc-
cess of the Russian intervention in Syria (which 
began on 30th September 2015), the looming 
prospect of strategic co-operation between the 
EU and Russia over the conflict in Syria and the 
fight against terrorism (following the terrorist 
attacks in Paris on 13th November 2015). In both 
cases there was a real risk that Turkey would 
be pushed out of the Syrian game and this was 
most likely the main reason for the escalation 
of tensions between Turkey and Russia which 
culminated in Turkey shooting down a Russian 
warplane (on 24th November 2015). Contrary to 
Ankara’s expectations, it did not receive suffi-
The fact that Turkey is actively using the 
migration crisis to its advantage and that 
this may lead to an attempt to permanent-
ly redefine Turkish-EU relations seems to 
be the decisive factor which is generating 
the present bilateral tensions.
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cient support from the EU or the US in order 
to defend its own interests in the case of the 
security zone or the conflict with Russia. At the 
same time Turkey regarded US support for Syri-
an Kurds as a hostile activity. 
A radical shift in emphasis which was to bring 
about a new quality to Turkish-EU relations 
came in spring 2016. The EU felt a reduced mi-
gration pressure and began to have concerns 
about the constant deterioration of the internal 
situation in Turkey. Brussels increasingly pushed 
for Turkey to strictly implement the action plan 
in the area of the liberation of the visa regime 
(particularly the change in the restrictive an-
ti-terrorist law, used to fight the opposition). 
In this spirit the rhetoric against Turkey and its 
president intensified in the European media (in-
cluding vulgar attacks on German television) 
and a resolution was adopted in the German 
parliament which recognised the massacre of 
Armenians perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire 
in 1915 as genocide). The impetus for a further 
intensification of the criticism was provided 
by repression and purges in Turkey following 
a thwarted coup d’état (on 15th July). The key 
element of the agreement over the migration 
crisis, the liberalisation of the visa regime, was 
postponed on 30th June at least for several 
months (initially until October, unofficially until 
the end of 2016).
In Turkey there have been growing problems 
which are being solved contrary to EU expec-
tations. In particular, the fight against all forces 
which are independent or hostile towards the 
Turkish president, which ranges from removing 
a relatively autonomous Prime Minister Davu-
toglu from power, through repression of the 
independent media, to the purges in the coun-
try’s administration as a consequence of the 
failed coup (approximately 80,000 people have 
been subjected to repression in the civil service 
alone) and the ruthless quelling of the rebellion 
in south-eastern Turkey organised by the PKK. 
In the area of security, Turkey succeeded in rec-
onciling with Russia, which enabled it to return 
to the Syrian game, to launch an independent 
(approved by Moscow) intervention in Syria and 
to begin the process of establishing its own se-
curity zone (since 24th August this year). The EU 
remained passive or reluctant in the matters 
which the Turkish government saw as being 
essential for it. In Turkish-EU relations Anka-
ra toughened its rhetoric (including threats to 
break off co-operation over the migration crisis 
and suggestions to radically change the orien-
tation to take an anti-West position). However, 
it also increasingly frequently referred to the 
Turkish minority residing mainly in Germany 
(by organising pro-Turkish demonstrations) and 
attempted to put the media, mainly in Germa-
ny, under pressure, something previously un-
seen in Turkey’s politics. Nevertheless, despite 
threats and a slight increase in the number of 
migrants coming from Turkey11 the co-opera-
tion between Turkey and the EU has thus far 
been maintained, although its political rank has 
been substantially lowered – meetings with EU 
delegations are held at the level of EU commis-
sioners and Turkish ministers. 
The breakthrough year – conclusions 
and the outlook 
The 2015/2016 migration crisis has been the 
catalyst for extensive changes in Turkish-EU 
relations. These changes are both objective 
and linked with a correction in Turkey’s per-
ception of the EU. They have also led Turkey 
to fundamentally re-evaluate its goals and po-
11 The increase was caused most likely by the post coup 
purges in the agencies responsible for the execution of 
the agreement, as well as optimal for sea navigation 
time of the year.
The EU has remained passive or reluctant 
in matters which were essential for the 
Turkish government.
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litical instruments and to test them. The mi-
gration crisis has above all revealed the scale 
of genuine threats from the Middle East and 
Africa (demographic pressure, threat of ter-
rorism, the impact on Muslim communities 
in Europe and the related increase in pop-
ulism) and the fact that they are permanent. 
Turkey has emerged as a vital partner in mini-
mising the threats from the Middle East and as 
a country which is capable of effective co-op-
eration in containing EU strategic challenges. 
Thus for the first time in the history of Turk-
ish-EU relations, the EU has had to depend on 
Ankara’s policy over a strategic issue. This is 
likely to continue and the imbalance in Turk-
ish-EU relations has been corrected to Turkey’s 
advantage. The situation has generated great 
tension and re-evaluations in its bilateral rela-
tions with the EU.
Despite favourable circumstances and contrary 
to official political assumptions, the strategic 
mechanism which regulates relations between 
Turkey and the EU - EU integration - seems to be 
coming to an end. Apart from traditional and 
growing mutual distrust, the shape and speed 
of this process is ill-adjusted to Ankara’s polit-
ical aspirations and the process of adapting to 
EU standards in fact runs against Turkey’s prior-
ities in its internal politics. Ankara’s stance has 
swiftly crystallised in recent months, both as 
a response to the EU’s unsatisfying position 
and due to a further deterioration of Turkey’s 
internal situation. At that time not only did the 
EU not manifest it is able to effectively impact 
the attitude of the Turkish government to sen-
sitive issues (e.g. the anti-terrorist law, protec-
tion of the freedom of the media, the Kurds), 
it also lost its position as a point of reference 
and support for opposition circles, stimulat-
ing pro-European and democratic practices12. 
At present the chances of reversing this trend 
(which is unfavourable for the EU) are rather 
infinitesimal. The shift in the balance of power 
between Turkey and the EU, the crisis of the 
concept of EU integration and the burning is-
sues (internal and regional) Ankara is facing 
have led to a revision of Turkey’s relations with 
the EU. The Turkish government seems ready 
to ruthlessly exploit the weakness of the West 
(above all, its susceptibility to the implications 
of the migration crisis) and to further devel-
op the instruments to put the EU under pres-
sure (among them blackmailing the EU with 
the threat that co-operation will be broken 
off,  and potential actions taken in order to 
mobilise Turkish and Muslim communities in 
Europe). At the same time, Turkey will take au-
tonomous measures in matters which it deems 
to be important; this will be done in short-
term co-operation with other players, and will 
include measures which run counter to EU or 
US interests. One of the manifestations of this 
approach is the spectacular and effective rap-
prochement with Russia over the Syrian con-
flict, following a period of the greatest crisis 
in bilateral relations in decades. Nor should 
the tightening of short-term co-operation be-
tween Turkey and Syrian opposition groups 
(who the West views as being dangerous) be 
ruled out. It happened in the past and it is tak-
ing place at present.
Turkey is becoming freer and more assertive 
and is exhibiting anti-West frustration. Nor can 
a further escalation of tensions be ruled out. 
In spite of all this, it seems rather unlikely that 
Turkey will sever ties with the Euro-Atlantic 
12 See: Can Dündar’dan Merkel’e mektup: Yanlış saftasınız, 
Diken, 24.04.2016, http://www.diken.com.tr/dundar-
dan-merkele-mektup-turkiyedeki-ip-cekme-mucade-
lesinde-yanlis-saftasiniz/
Turkey will undertake independent mea-
sures in matters which it deems to be 
important. It will do this in short-term 
co-operation with other players, and will 
include measures which run counter to 
EU or US interests.
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structures, and it is even less likely to change 
its orientation to take an unequivocally anti-EU 
position (e.g. based on its relations with Russia). 
The EU is not only an attractive partner for Tur-
key, particularly in the area of the economy, 
but there is no alternative to this partnership 
for Turkey. Turkey’s attempts to seek partners 
in the Middle East (between 2009 and 2013) 
have not yielded any results and the present 
conditions for this seem far worse. Irrespective 
of the rapprochement with Russia and the pres-
ent and future co-operation, there are a host 
of serious conflicts of interests dividing these 
two countries, as well as a deep rooted mutual 
distrust and the conviction that the other part-
ner is unpredictable. Above all, Russia’s military 
power and the readiness to use it is an impor-
tant asset for Turkey, but it is the only one and 
it is unambiguously insufficient when it comes 
to supplanting the EU as a strategic partner. 
Assuming that the present internal trends in 
Turkey (President Erdogan maintaining and 
asserting his power) continue and that the EU 
maintains its present course, it may be expect-
ed that relations between the EU and Turkey 
will evolve towards a more balanced, dynamic 
and challenging partnership which combines 
both elements of co-operation and conflict, 
and which resembles the entire spectrum of 
EU-Russian relations before 2014. 
